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1. Introduction
A standard critique of the strategic, two-stage industrial and trade policy models is that trade
policy recommendations depend on the nature of competition between firms. Brander and
Spencer (1985) have shown that under quantity competition in an international market
governments opt for export subsidies to maximize national welfare. However, as shown by
Eaton and Grossman (1986), trade policy conclusions are different if there is Bertrand price
competition instead of Cournot quantity competition. Then the optimal trade policy is to tax
exports. In these two papers production is for a third country and the governments act
strategically to distort free trading. The interesting question is therefore, whether their
propositions on opposite trade policy recommendations do also hold if the assumption of no
home consumption is dropped. Since the case of no home consumption is anyway not very
realistic, we will check the robustness of the propositions under price or quantity competition
when goods are consumed domestically with intra-industry trade between the two competing
countries. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether trade policy always switches
from export subsidy to export tax if firms engage in Bertrand competition instead of Cournot
competition with trade between the two countries. In section 2 we will show that an export
subsidy is optimal also under intra-industry trade. In section 3 we will characterize market
structures and types of goods where an export subsidy is even optimal under Bertrand price
competition. In Section 4 we will use the same model to derive inducements for import tariffs
(or subsidies) if the nature of competition is Bertrand Section 5 concludes the paper.
22. An optimal export subsidy under intra-industry trade
We choose the same simple model of firm behavior as in Brander and Spencer, i.e. with one
domestic firm and one foreign firm which produce identical products. I begin by analyzing the
last stage of the two stage game, that is, the choice of output for the domestic as well as for the
foreign market. The domestic firm produces output x for the domestic market and output xE
for the foreign market at cost c(x + xE). Let us denote by lower case letters the domestic
variables and by upper case letters the corresponding foreign variables. Then profit  of the
domestic firm is:
(1) p ( , , , ; ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x X X s p x X x P X x x c x x s xE E E E E E E= + + + - + + ◊
Revenue is the sum of revenue in the domestic market and of revenue in the foreign market.
x+XE is total sales in the domestic country’s market and p(x + XE) is the inverse domestic
demand function. X + xE is total sales in the foreign country’s market and P(X + xE) is the
inverse foreign demand function. Similarly, profit  of the foreign firm is given by:1
(2) P( , , , ; ) ( ) ( ) ( )X X x x S P X x X p x X X C X X S XE E E E E E E= + + + - + + ◊
The Nash equilibrium in the four outputs is characterized by the first-order conditions:
(3) p x xp xp c= + ¢ - = 0
(4) p x E xE P x P c s= + ¢ - + = 0
(5) PX XP XP C= + ¢ - = 0
(6) PX E XE p X p C S= + ¢ - + = 0
where x x xE= +   and  X X XE= +   is total supply. The second order conditions are:
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  In Brander (1991) the two countries are assumed to be identical (same price, same cost functions), but there are
transport costs and increasing returns to scale due to fixed costs.
3p pxx x x XX X XE E E E< < < <0 0 0 0, , , .P P
We assume that own effects of output on marginal profit dominate cross effects, which
ensures uniqueness and global stability of the equilibrium in non-cooperative models. Since
we will assume linear demand functions and constant returns to scale (CRTS) to bring out the
main points, the equilibrium is unique and globally stable. The solutions of (3) to (6) depend
on domestic and foreign subsidies s and S and can be written as
(7)  x x s S x x s S X X s S X X s SE E E E= = = =( , ) , ( , ) , ( , ) , ( , )
Given our assumption of CRTS, the reaction functions derived from (3) to (6) are:
(8) x r X x r X s X R x X R x SE E E E E E= = = =( ) , ( , ) , ( ) , ( , )
If in the first stage of the game the national governments change s, or S respectively, then the
reaction functions2 of export supply will shift and outputs in (7), and hence foreign market
shares, will change. If the domestic government raises the subsidy rate s, then the domestic
firm will export more, the foreign firm will react by supplying less for its market, and
therefore the domestic firm will increase its market share in the foreign country, i.e.
x X xE E/ ( )+ . An algebraic analysis requires total differentiation of (3) to (6) with respect to
x x X X sE E, , ,  and S. Under the assumptions made (linear demand and CRTS), we obtain:
(9) dx
ds
dx
ds P
dX
ds P
dX
ds
E E= = -
¢
> =
¢
< =0 2
3
0 1
3
0 0, , ,
(10) dx
dS p
dx
dS
dX
dS
dX
dS p
E E=
¢
< = = =-
¢
>1
3
0 0 0 2
3
0, , , .
The relationship between export and domestic supply of the competing firm is:
(11) dx dX dX dxE E=- =-
1
2
1
2
,  .
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  It is 
dX
dx
R x
E
E= ¢ <( ) 0
4From (9) and (10) follows that the supply of goods on the other market is increasing in the
subsidy rate, i.e.
(12) d
ds
X x d
ds
x XE E( ) , ( )+ > + =0 0
(13) d
dS
x X d
dS
X xE E( ) , ( )+ > + =0 0
Thus the governments know that subsidies will lower prices in the competing country and will
not change prices in the own country. Their goal is to maximize national welfare in terms of
home consumer surplus and industry profit. They are aware of the effect of subsidies on the
terms of trade and on rent-shifting in foreign trade. The domestic government maximizes:
(14) max ( ; ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ; , , )
s
E E
x X
E E Ew s S p d p x X x X x x X X s s x
E
= - + +
L
NM
O
QP
+ - ◊
+
z x x p
0
A similar objective function can be written down for the foreign government. The first order
condition for (14) is an implicit reaction function of the domestic government. Since the price
on the domestic market will not change (see (12)), consumer surplus will not change. Since
p px xE= = 0 and  
dX
ds
E = 0, the f.o.c. of (14) reduces to
p pX s E E
dX
ds
s
dx
ds
x+ - - = 0   or, as   p s Ex=     and    p X EP x= ¢ ◊ , to
(15) s P x
dX
ds
dx
ds
E
E
= ¢ ◊ > 0
This is exactly the export subsidy, derived in Brander and Spencer (1985, p. 89) when export
is for a third country market. Since under our assumption of CRTS consumer surplus in the
domestic market does not change, rent shifting concentrate solely on profit as in Brander and
Spencer. Using (9), the subsidy is s P xE= - ¢
2
 , or, in terms of market structure and conduct:
5(16) s x
X x
PE
E p
=
+
1
2 e
where
e P E
E
d X x
dP
P
X x
= +
+
<( ) 0
is the foreign price elasticity of demand. The subsidy increases with the share of export in
foreign demand and is the higher the less elastic the foreign price elasticity is.
The foreign government can act in a similar way by imposing a subsidy S, similar to
(15), given the other government is passive. A non-cooperate Nash equilibrium in subsidies
occurs if each government is assumed to choose its subsidy level given the subsidy level of
the other government. The optimal values of the subsidy rates in equilibrium are the solution
of the two implicit reaction functions ∂
∂
w
s
= 0 and ∂
∂
W
S
= 0. Since the subsidy of one
government affects welfare of the other country only indirect through its impact on output
levels, the solution will always be a subsidy and not a tax.
To complete the analysis of quantity competition under trade subsidies we compare the
intra-industry trade model with the model by Brander and Spencer (1985) where export is for
a third market and where consumer surplus is included in the government’s welfare function.
Then the domestic firm maximizes
max ( ) ( ) ( )
,x x
E E E E E E
E
p x x P x X x c x x s xp = + + - + + ◊
and the foreign firm maximizes
max ( ) ( ) ( )
,X X E E E E E EE
P X X P x X X C X X S XP = + + - + + ◊
where P x XE E E( )+  is the third country’s demand function. The government maximizes
max ( , ) ( ) ( )
s
x
Ew s S p d p x x s x= - + - ◊z x x p
0
6Again, under constant marginal costs, the markets are separated in terms of output decision
making, and home consumer surplus is not affected by the subsidy. It is easy to show that the
subsidy is
s P x
dX
ds
dx
ds
E E
E
E
= ¢ > 0
In the intra-industry trade model it is dX
ds
E = 0, i.e. the domestic subsidy does not affect
foreign export decision if S is kept unchanged. In the model with export for a third country,
the competitor reduces his export quantity, i.e. dX
ds
E < 0 . A comparative static analysis shows
that dX
ds P
and dx
ds P
E
E
E
E
=
¢
< = -
¢
>1
3
0 2
3
0 . Hence s P x X xE E E E= - ¢ +( ) 2   or
(16’) s P x
x X
E
P
E
E EE
=
+
1
2 e
where
e P E E
E
E
E E
E
d X x
dP
P
X x
= +
+
( )
 .
If we compare the difference in the subsidy under intra-industry trade (16) and under third
market exports, we recognize that in (16’) only variables, affecting the third country, enter the
subsidy formula. In (16), however, price and quantity on the competitor’s home market enters
the subsidy. Its export volumn XE is not relevant for the size of the subsidy.
3. Subsidizing exports under price competition
The main purpose of the previous section has been to present the basic structure of our intra-
industry trade model which will also be used when firms engage in price competition. Making
the same assumption in either models (CRTS and linear demand functions), it is easier to
7understand strategic trade policy under price and quantity competition. For each firm there are
prices p, and P respectively, and quantities x, xE, X and XE which are jointly related by the
demand functions x = x(p, P), etc. In this heterogeneous duopoly each national monopolist
produces for the domestic as well as for the foreign market. We start by analyzing again the
last stage of the game, the choices of prices, given the subsidy rates. Profit for the domestic
firm is:
(17) max ( , ; ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
p E E
p P s p x p P p x p P c x s x p Pp = ◊ + ◊ - + ◊
where  x x p P x p PE= +( , ) ( , )  is total domestic production. Similarly, profit of the foreign
firm is:
(18) max ( , ; ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
P E E
p P S P X p P P X p P C X S X p PP = ◊ + ◊ - + ◊
The Bertrand equilibrium in the two prices is characterized by the two f.o.c.:
(19) x p c x
p
s
x
px
E+ - + =( ) ∂
∂
∂
∂
0
(20) X P C X
P
S X
PX
E+ - + =( ) ∂
∂
∂
∂
0
The second order conditions and the condition for uniqueness and global stability of the
equilibrium are satisfied under our assumption of CRTS and linear demand functions. Linear
demand functions are derived from a quadratic indirect utility function for the domestic
consumer.3 Then the home and the export demand functions are:
(21) x p P= - +a a bo
(22) X P pE E E= - +a a bo
with  a a> >0 0, E   and  b ≥ 0  since we assume goods to be ordinary substitutes.
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8Preferences of the foreign consumers are assumed to be identical, so that home and
export demand are:
(23) X P p= - +a a bo
(24) x p PE E E= - +a a bo
Finally, since an indirect utility function must be convex in the prices, this property implies
the following inequality on the parameters:
(25) a a bE - >2 0
The solutions to (19) and (20) depend on domestic and foreign subsidies s and S and can be
written as:
(26) p p s S P P s S= =( , ) ; ( , )
If in the first stage of the game the governments change s, or S respectively, then the reaction
functions p r P s= ( , )  and P R p S= ( , ) , derived from (19) and (20), will shift and prices in (26),
and hence market shares will change. To derive the direction of the price changes under
export subsidies we have to do comparative statics by totally differentiating (19) and (20) with
respect to p, P, s, and S. The results are:4   
(27) dp
ds
dP
dS D
dP
ds
dp
dS D
E E E= = - + < = = - ◊ <2 0 2 0a a a a b( ) ,
where D is the determinant with D E= + - >4 4 0
2 2( )a a b . Both firms’ Bertrand equilibrium
levels of prices are decreasing under national as well as foreign subsidization. The reaction of
prices in (27) on a subsidy implies for the quantities, using (21) - (24):
(28) dx
ds
dx
ds
dX
ds
and dX
ds
E E> > < <0 0 0 0, , ,
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9and similarly for S. Domestic total supply increases in the subsidy rate and foreign supply
decreases.
Next we analyze the first stage of the game, the maximization of national welfare by
the government. The objective function, given the foreign subsidy, consists of consumer
surplus and of profit less the subsidy:
(29) max ( ; ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ; )
s
p
p
E
p
p
Ew s S x P d X P d p P s s x
E
= + + - ◊z zx x x x p
with profit and the linear demand functions as given in (17), and (21) - (24). p  is the finite
„choke“ price which leads to zero sales, i.e. p  from x p P( , ) = 0 , which implies
(30) p P P( ) ( )= +b a
a
0
Similarly, if the domestic firm sets the price as low as pE , given P, the foreign firm will not
sell anything on the domestic market. This implies
(31) p P PE E
E
( ) ( )= -a a
b
0
 .
The f.o.c. of (29) is:
(32) dw s S
ds
dCS
ds
dCS
ds
dp
ds
dP
ds
x s
dx
ds
E
p P S E
E( ; ) = + + + + - - =p p p 0
where CS and CSE are the consumer surpluses, derived from the integrals in (29):
CS x p p CS X p pE E E=
◊ - = ◊ -( ) , ( )
2 2
The derivatives of the consumer surplus with respect to s are:5
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10
(33) dCS
ds
x dx
ds
= >
a
0 ,
(34) dCS
ds
X dX
ds
E E E= <
b
0  .
A subsidy increases home consumer surplus as it increases x and it decreases consumer
surplus from imports as XE decreases. The next terms in (32) are p p = 0  because of (19),
p s Ex=  , and
(35) p ∂
∂
∂
∂P x
Ep c x
P
s
x
P
= - + ◊( )
and finally,
(36) s dx
ds
s
x
p
dp
ds
x
P
dP
ds
E E E= +
F
HG
I
KJ
∂
∂
∂
∂
Solving (32) for s, using (35) and (36) yields:
(37) - = + +s dp
ds
dCS
ds
dCS
ds
dP
dsE
E
Pa p
0
where
p bP xp c
0 2 0= - ≥( )
is p P  in (35) but without s
x
P
E◊ ∂
∂
 which cancels out if p P  is inserted in (32). Next, we divide
both sides by - dp
ds
:
(38) s dp
ds
dCS
ds
dCS
ds
dP
ds
E
E
P= + +
L
NM
O
QP
1 0
a
p
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Since not all three terms in the bracket are positive, there is an incentive for an unilateral
subsidization in some market and for a taxation of exports in other market. The first term,
dCS
ds
> 0, supports a subsidization. Although a lower P shifts the demand curve for the
domestic output x downwards, the lower own price p dominates the consumers’ surplus
reducing effect as dx
ds
 increases. However, dCS
ds
E < 0 ; again, a lower P increases import
demand XE, but the effect of an even lower price cut of p reduces import demand. Since
dX
ds
E < 0 , consumers lose surplus from consuming less imports XE and they gain surplus from
consuming more domestic output x. Therefore, a necessary condition for s > 0 is that the
positive CS effect dominates the negative CSE effect. A sufficient condition is that this
positive net effect dominates the negative effect of a subsidy on profit as the foreign firm
responds to a lower p by also lowering its price P. Our central question will be to characterize
markets where this total net effect will become positive.
Let us first consider the case that the goods are independent; i.e.  = 0. Then is dP
ds
= 0
and CSE is a constant, i.e. 
dCS
ds
E = 0. Furthermore, profit will not change either as the
competitor does not respond to s. In that case, the subsidy is s x
E
=
a
, or
(39) s p
x
x
x p
E
E
=
◊
>
e
,
0
where  e ax p E
E
E
p
x
,
=   is the export price elasticity. If the export price elasticity is high, the
subsidy is low, and it increases if x
x
E
 is low. The inducement to introduce a subsidy is to raise
the share of domestic production x  to foreign production X  as dx
ds
> 0  and  dX
ds
= 0. The
other extreme case is that the goods are perfect substitutes, i.e. a b a= = E . Now the
inducement is to tax exports:
s
X xE E
E
= - + =- <
a
a
a
2 00
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It is  dx
ds
dx
ds
E= > 0, but  dX
ds
dx
ds
E E= -   and  dx
ds
dX
ds
=- . There is no way to change the balance
of trade and no need to pay a subsidy. The higher the trade volume, the higher the tax. It is s =
S
 and there is no tax competition between the governments since the tax is a constant.
A standard case in oligopoly theory is to assume symmetry, i.e. a a0 0
E
x Xc C= =,   and
a a= E . In that case it is  x x X XE E= = = .  The following proposition can be proven:
Proposition 1: If the firms are symmetric, then there is a unilateral incentive to introduce an
export subsidy s > 0 if  a b2 23 0- > .
If we use  b
a
2
2   as  an index of product differentiation since this expression uniformly
increases from zero to unity as the goods range from being independent ( = 0) to perfect
substitutes ( = ), then this index should be less than 1/3. We will call those goods which
satisfy this condition, weak substitutes. The lower , the lower  p P
0
 and dP
ds
, and hence the
negative impact on profit from the price cut of the competitor. In that case, the positive
consumer surplus effect dominates the other two negative effects, and s is a subsidy.
Examples of weak substitutes are goods with a wellknown brand name like French
champagne or German luxury cars. It is of national interest for some cuntries to expand or to
keep the export share of those products. In this category belong also goods which seem to be
good substitutes but are not in reality. The French auto makers, for example, are strong only in
their own market. On the back of a government incentive scheme that helped small-car buyers
sales climbed rapidly in the French market in 1996. There is a fight for market shares in
Europe’s auto market in which the weakest, those with high costs and a narrow market base,
will find themselves in real trouble. National pride, always linked to car manufacture, stands
in the way of cross-border mergers and the closing of plants.
Another special case of our model could be a multinational firm located in one
country. If it is located in the domestic country, then  XE = 0   and  x p= -a a0 . The subsidy
then is determined by the following formula:6
Proposition 2: The incentive of a government to subsidize its multinational firm is:
s
A
x xE= + -
1 2 2( ( ) )a a a b
                                                          
6
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where  A E E= + - >a a a a b( ( ) )2 02 .  A sufficient condition for s > 0 is that xE is not greater
than 3x. Since exports xE are normally not greater than three times production for the domestic
market, a subsidy s > 0 and not a tax s < 0 is very likely.
We finally consider the case that the goods are complements, i.e.  < 0.
Proposition 3: The sign of the subsidy s will not change with the sign of . The inducement to
subsidize does not depend on whether the goods are substitutes ( > 0) or complements ( <
0).
In order to prove this statement, we show that the expression for s does only depend on
 2. The formula for s is:
s
B
x
x X xE E
E
= + - - -
+
L
NM
O
QP
1 22 2( ) ( )a a b a a
b
a a
where B E E
E
= + -
+
>( ) ) ( )a a b
a
a a
2 22 0.
We finally turn to the general case. For that purpose we use (33) and (34) to rewrite (38):
(40) s dp
ds
x dx
ds
X dX
ds
dP
ds
E
E E
P=
- + +
L
NM
O
QP
1 0
a a b
p
or, by introducing price elasticities:
(41) s dp
ds
p dx
ds
p dX
ds
dP
ds
E
x p X p
E
P
E
= + +
L
N
MM
O
Q
PP
1 0
a e e
p
, ,
where  e ax p
p
x
,
= ◊    and   e bX p
E
E
p
X,
= ◊ . An incentive for a subsidy s > 0 can be derived, if
the price elasticity e x p,  for domestic goods is low and the price elasticity for imported goods
e X pE ,  is rather high at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. An inducement for an export tax s < 0 is
possible if the reverse holds; the price elasticity  e x p,  is high and the price elasticity for
imported goods e X pE ,  is rather low. How could such a market be characterized where taxation
14
of exports is a reasonable strategy? It could be a market where domestic marginal cost are
rather high and therefore p is high. Due to the high price elasticity for domestic goods,
consumers buy low quantities x and prefer the imported good which is cheaper due to lower
marginal costs. If the government puts the same weight on consumer and on producer surplus,
then a tax on exports is a collectively rational trade policy. In reality, however, there will be
no incentive to introduce such a tax, because governments do not wish to increase the flow of
imported goods just to raise consumer surplus from imported goods. They are interested in the
shift of profit to domestic firms, represented by the term PP
0
 , and in raising consumer surplus
due to lower domestic prices, i.e. because of dp
ds
< 0. A government would therefore put
higher weights on these two aspects in its welfare function and would give the consumer
surplus effect from imports a low weight.
Since there is subsidy competition for shifting market shares, the action of both
governments must be considered. The Nash equilibrium which occurs if each government acts
independently given the subsidy rate set by the other government, can be obtained by solving
two first order conditions with respect to s and S; i.e dw
ds
and dW
dS
= =0 0. Since the
subsidy program of each government affects welfare of the other government only indirectly,
i.e. through ist impact on prices, the subsidy rates in the Nash equilibrium will have the same
structure as in (40).
4. Import tariffs under price competition
Since the role of export subsidies as an instrument for interventionist trade or industrial policy
is quite limited, we will analyze in this section the inducement to introduce taxes on imports.
Before we try to find cases for strategic import taxes by governments, we state the problem of
the firm, given a tax on imports:
(42) max ( , ; ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
p E
p P t p x p P t p x p T P c xp = ◊ + + ◊ + -
where  x x p P t x p T PE= + + +( , ) ( , )  is total domestic production. Similarly, profit of the
foreign firm is:
15
(43) max ( , ; ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )
P E
p P T P X p T P P X p P t C XP = ◊ + + ◊ + - .
The f.o.c. are:
(44) - + - + + + - + =( ) ( )a a b b a a aE x E Ep c P t T2 2 00 0
(45) - + - + + + - + =( ) ( )a a b b a a aE X E EP C p T t2 2 00 0
where we used again the linear demand functions as specified in (21) - (24).
In order to derive the direction of the price changes if in the first stage of the game the
governments change the import tax rates, we do again comparative statics. The outcome is:
(46) dp
dt
dP
dT D
dp
dT
dP
dt D
E E= = > = = - + - <2 0 2 0
2a b a a a b
,
( ( ) )
where D > 0 as in (27). The equilibrium level of prices increases if the own government taxes
imports, and it decreases if the other government raises import taxes. This reaction implies for
the quantities:7
(47) dx
dt
dx
dt
dX
dt
and dX
dt
E E> < > <0 0 0 0, , , .
A tax on imports will promote domestic production x, of course, but will lower export demand
xE as the domestic firm raises its price whereas the foreign firm lowers its price. The demand
for foreign export XE will be lower, but the foreign firm can partly compensate this loss in
output by a higher supply on its own market.
Taxes on imports can be justified in cases of negative externalities, which must be
reduced by taxing the polluting activities. For instance, if a nation suffers from transborder
pollution from foreign production. Examples are foreign producers of domestic demand for
steel causing acid rain in the domestic country, or upstream paper mills in the foreign country
causing costs of waste dumping in the downstream (domestic) country which affects the
                                                          
7
  To check the signs, the demand functions (21) - (24) have to be differentiated and then (46) has to be used.
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quality of the river services (scenery, swimming, fishing).8 In such a situation the only way in
which the domestic country can discourage the foreign pollution is by taxing imports of the
product made by a polluting process. Imports can also be taxed if they emit CFCs or
contribute to the carbon dioxide building up from fossil fuel, provided the domestic country
has banned CFCs or wishes to reduce carbon dioxide (energy tax, gasoline tax). In the latter
case there is in reality no intra-industry trade so that the foreign country can not respond by
initiating a tax competition.
To show that an inducement to tax imports exists we analyze the first stage of the
game. The objective function of the domestic government, given a foreign tax on imports
(which can be zero, of course), is:
(48) max ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ; , ) ( , )
t
p
p
E
p
p
Ew t T x P t d X P t d p P t T t X p P t
E
= + + + + + ◊ +z zx x x x p
where the „choke“ prices are
(49) p P t P t p P t P tE E E( )
( )
, ( ) ( )+ = + + + = + -b a
a
a a
b
0
0
 .
The f.o.c. of (48) is:
(50) d w t T
dt
d CS
dt
d CS
dt
dp
dt
dP
dt
X t d X
dt
E
p P t E
E( ; ) = + + + + + + =p p p 0 .
The formulas for the consumer surpluses are the same as derived in the previous section.
Furthermore, it is  p p bp t xp c= = -0 , ( )  and  p bP xp c= -2 ( ). The tax rate,or optimal
response function to a foreign import tax, is therefore
(51) t d X
dt
d CS
dt
CS
dt
p c dP
dt
X
E
E
x E=
- + + - +FH
I
K +
L
NM
O
QP
1 2 1b ( )
where
                                                          
8
  See Lindert and Pugel (1996), International Economics, Chapter 12, 9th edition.
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d CS
dt
x dx
dt
d CS
dt
X d X
dt
E E E= > = <
a b
0 0,
can be derived in a similar way as done for (33) and (34). Since9  dP
dt
> - 1
2
 , the third term in
the brackets is positive. If the three positive terms dominate the only negative term, the loss in
consumer surplus from imports XE, then t is an import tax and not a subsidy. Since in reality
x>XE, we expect that the consumer surplus effect  
d CS
dt
 , the positive net effect on profit from
the import tax  p pP t
dP
dt
+FH
I
K   and the tariff revenue effect  
d t X
dt
X given XE E E
( )
,
◊ =FH
I
K
dominate the negative consumer surplus effect from reduced imports that must be set against
it.
Again, import tax competition between government could be considered resulting in a
Nash equilibrium in import tax rates. If, for example, one government taxes imported coal on
environmental grounds, the other government might tax imported wine or cognac for reasons
of health.
5. Concluding remarks
The purpose of our analysis has been to resume the question how comparative advantages can
be created by subsidies or taxes if firms compete in prices. Our point of departure has been
that strategic trade models are supposed to be not robust with respect to their policy
recommendation which depends on whether there is price or quantity competition. Since price
competition prevails in high-tech industries as semiconductors, computers,
telecommunications or aircrafts, it is of interest to show whether strategic trade policy
suggests to encourage such industries as has been shown if there is quantity competition.
These high-tech industries are characterized by intra-industry trade, require large-scale
production to achieve economies of scale, and give rise to extensive external economies when
successful. Most nations encourage development in these industries, although not by taxing
imports or subsidizing exports, but by financing research and development, granting tax
advantages for investment in the industry, while protecting the domestic market from foreign
                                                          
9
  For a proof see the Appendix
18
competition. It is, however, no problem to reformulate our intra-industry price competition
model in order to analyze international R&D rivalry and industrial strategy.10 While strategic
trade policy can theoretically improve the market outcome in oligopolistic markets subject to
extensive external economies and increase the country’s growth and welfare, we are fully
aware of the serious difficulties in implementing it. However, although the role of taxes and
subsidies in international trade is quite limited, a stringent analysis of an inducement to
introduce these instruments and of their effects on domestic production and trade flours
should be part of the theory on strategic trade under imperfect competition. Our objective was
only to weaken the argument that strategic trade models are of limited use, because the
particular policy recommendation depends critically on the nature of competition.
                                                          
10
  See Brander and Spencer (1983) where competition is in terms of quantities.
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Appendix
The demand functions in (21) and (22) are derived from an indirect quadratic utility function
where some parameters have been set equal to zero a priori (m is income):
v p P m v p P m p P p PE m E( , , ) ~ ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~= + + + ◊ + + +0 0 0 2 2 120 5 0 5a a a a a a
Using Roy’s identity, we obtain linear demand functions:
x
v
p
v
m
p P
m
=
-
= - + +
∂
∂
∂
∂
a a a
a
(~ ~ ~ )
~
0 12
X
v
p
v
m
P p
E
E
E
m
=
-
= - + ◊ +
∂
∂
∂
∂
a a a
a
(~ ~ ~ )
~
0 12
Defining the parameters b a
a
= -
~
~
12
m
 , a a
a
a a
a
a a
a
= = = -
~
~
,
~
~
,
~
m
E
E
m
E
E
m
0
0
 , and  - =
~
~
~
a
a
a0 0
m
  yields
the demand functions in (21) and (22). Of course, neither the utility function nor the demand
functions are homogeneous of degree zero in p, P and m.
Proof of (27)
The f.o.c. (19) and (20) with linear demand function and CRTS are:
(A1) x p c sx E E- - + =( ) ( )a a a
(A2) X P C SX E E- - + =( ) ( )a a a
Total differentials yields:
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(A3) - + + =
- + + =
2 2
2 2
( )
( )
a a b a
a a b a
E E
E E
dp dP ds
dP dp dS
To derive (27) is standard algebra.
Proof of (33) and (34)
dCS
ds
p p dp
ds
dP
ds
x dP
ds
dp
ds
dp
ds
p p x
dP
ds
dp
ds
p p x
= - - +FH
I
K + -
F
HG
I
KJ
= - - - + - +FH
I
K
L
N
MMM
O
Q
PPP
1
2 2
1
2
( )
( )
a b b
a
a b
a
Next, it is:
- - - = - + -FHG
I
KJ - = -a a
b
a
a
a
( )p p x P p x x0 2
and
p p x P p x x- + = + - + =
a
b
a
a
a a a
0 2
Therefore,
dCS
ds
x
dp
ds
dP
ds
x x dp
ds
dP
ds
= - + = - +FH
I
K fib a a a b ( )33
Furthermore,
dCS
ds
p p dP
ds
dp
ds
X dp
ds
dP
ds
dp
ds
p p X
dP
ds
dp
ds
p p X
E
E E
E E
E E E E
E
E
= - - +FH
I
K + -
F
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I
KJ
= - + + - - -
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N
MMM
O
Q
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1
2 2
1
2
( )
( ) ( ( )
a b a
b
b a a
b
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It is:
( )p p X p P X XE E E E E E- + = - + + =b b a a 0 2
and
- - - = - + - - = -a a
b
a a
b
a a a
b
a
bE E
E
E E
E
E
E E
E
E
Ep p X p P X X( ) ( )0 2
Therefore:
dCS
ds
X dp
ds
X dP
ds
X dp
ds
dP
ds
E
E
E
E
E
E= - = -
F
H
I
K fi
a
b b
b a ( )34
Multinational firm:
X x pE = = -0 0, a a
Profit of the multinational firm:
p a a= ◊ - + ◊ - +p p p x c x s xE E( ) ( )0
Profit for the foreign firm:
P = ◊ -P X p P C X( , ) ( )
The f.o. conditions are:
(19’) x p c sE x E- + - - =( )( )a a a 0
X P CX- - =a a 0
For the comparative statics we obtain:
(20’) - + + =2 ( )a a b aE Edp dP ds
b adp dP- =2 0
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It is
D E= + -4
2a a a b( )
and
dp
ds D
E= - <2 0a a            and         dP
ds D
E=- b a
It is
dx
ds
dp
ds D
E=- =a a a2
2
The formula for the subsidy is now:
(38’) s dp
ds
dCS
ds
dP
ds
E
P= +
L
NM
O
QP
1 0
a
p
where
p bP xp c
0 = -( )  ,       and        p c s xx E
E
- = - +
+
( )
( )
a
a a
follows from (19’). Replacing  p P0   in (38’) yields:
s
dp
ds
dP
ds
x dx
ds
x dP
dsE E E
a b
a a a
b
a a
+
+
L
NM
O
QP = + +
By using the expressions, derived for  dp
ds
dP
ds
,  ,  and  dx
ds
 , we obtain:
s x
x
E
E
E E
a
a a a b
a a
a b
a a
2
2
2 2( )+ -
+
= -
+
or
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s x x
E E
E= + -
+ -1
2
22
2
a a a a b
a a a b( ) ( ( ) )
If we use the inequalities  a b a b> >, E  , then a sufficient condition for s > 0 is that xE is not
greater than 3x.
Proof of  dP
dt
> - 1
2
  in (51):
It is
dP
dt D E E
E E
E
= - + - = - + -
+ -
> -2 2
4
1
2
2
2
2 2( ( ) )
( ( ) )
( )a a a b
a a a b
a a b
      Q.e.d.
